- Major combat operations. A force of 263 ships, smaller than the 313-ship fleet that Roughead has said he wants, tailored for battle against a peer competitor. This fleet would be composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes, 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines including attack, ballistic and cruise missiles boats.
- Shaping force. A fleet of 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats better suited to littoral, maritime security and partnership operations. This force would be composed of six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries, and 32 submarines of all classes.
- Balanced force. A fleet of 474 ships able to conduct operations from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security. This force would be composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.
My problem with this is that the VIRGINIA class submarine is one of the few recent capital ships to come down in price in recent history. The submarine force has reduced the cost per hull from $2.5B to $2.0B (CY2005$). Compare and contrast with LCS and projections for DDG-1000. Now, VADM Morgan proposes that we get reduce the numbers of submarines instead of leveraging programs with momentum.
Also, when is the last time we've used amphibious ships, other than is a humanitarian assistance mission? Do we really think we're going to go and execute WWII style landing? Opposed? If we want to do the humanitarian assistance, foreign engagement mission, we should be building six more of these.